The Nazi regime's steadily growing strength, which resulted from its important accomplishments in economic and foreign policy, created a growing consensus in Germany. This was accompanied by an efficient use of a terror apparatus that allowed Hitler to continue advancing toward his goals. In 1938-1939, he abandoned his efforts to appear conciliatory in foreign policy and embarked on a series of offensive measures that led inexorably to world war. His resolve was buttressed by public approval, which, although fearful of the potential risks involved in the regime's policies, displayed growing support for the Fuehrer and his chosen course.
Public Opinion
Growing Support For The Regime
The Nazi regime's achievements in economic and domestic policy were among the major factors that bolstered the support it enjoyed in public opinion. Germany's Gross National Product climbed from 58 billion Reichsmarks in 1932 to 93 billion in 1937 - a more vigorous growth rate than the Weimar Republic had achieved even in its stable years. Growing numbers of citizens who had expressed pessimism and concern about the regime's economic policies in 1933ΓÇô1935 began to feel that Nazism was indeed meeting their basic material needs - jobs and food - and the output of quality consumer goods was rising. The public's sense of stability was enhanced by the impression that the regime was insuring ΓÇ£order.ΓÇ¥ The acts of terror committed by the security agencies, the establishment of concentration camps, the ban on the activity of political parties, and even the murderous spree involved in the liquidation of the S.A. leadership in 1934, all evoked a generally favourable public response as expressions of the government's resolve to impose order with a firm hand.
More On: Public Reaction To The SA Purge
For many Germans who regarded the Weimar Republic as a period of instability and personal insecurity, even the murderous terror such as that invoked against the SA leadership in June 1934 represented a step in the right direction: the imposition of order. Reports from SOPADE, the leadership-in-exile of the German labour movement, attested to the public mood after the ΓÇ£Night of the Long KnivesΓÇ¥ June 30, 1934: 'The immediate result of the murders was great confusion, both as regards to the way they were viewed and as regards their future political consequences. On the whole, Hitler's courage in taking decisive action was stressed the most. He was regarded practically as a hero. Hitler's slandering of the victims, their homosexuality and their 30,000 mark meals, was at first also adjudged heroic. As to what the repercussions of the events of the 30th June and their aftermath will be, an agreed and definitive answer cannot yet be given. Our comrades report that Hitler has won strong approval and sympathy from that part of the population, which still places its hopes in him. Other sections of the population have been given cause for thought.' (Peukert 71)
The Fuehrer Myth
The identification of much of the German population with the regime - and especially with the personality of the Fuehrer - was reinforced by Hitler's accomplishments in foreign policy. The reinstatement of military conscription, the annexation of the Saar, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the annexation of the Sudetenland, and, above all, the annexation of Austria in March 1938, all restored to many Germans the sense of pride which they had lost after their defeat in World War I. Hitler, for these Germans, was transformed into a heroic symbol. A report by a Social Democrat from Breslau, written after the German invasion of Austria, provides a glimpse of the sympathy for Hitler in public opinion: '…Although people didn't yet know how it had all happened, they were shouting in a sort of frenzy, Heil Hitler! Austria is ours! Sieg Heil to our brave soldiers' and so on. The atmosphere was similar to that of January 1933, when Hitler became Reich Chancellor. Everyone was carried away by this atmosphere…You could hear people saying that war was now on the way and that they were going to go home and pack and move out of the villages. But these were isolated voices. The general opinion in the groups was: 'Let's face it, Hitler is a great man, he knows what he wants and the world is scared of him'...I discovered one thing about the attitude of the population: if Germany were to become embroiled in a war today, the whole nation would march. And it would be probably a long time before the country began to have second thoughts about the war.' (Peukert 61)
Emerging Concern
Although much of the German society was euphoric about the regime's foreign-policy accomplishments, some Germans were becoming increasingly concerned about the future. Fears that Hitler's aggressive campaign of annexations in 1938ΓÇô1939 would lead to world war beset even those who had benefited from the stability and material well-being that the regime had ostensibly provided. A September 1938 report from the Wehrmacht 's economic control office stated that: 'The theatres are well patronised, and cinemas full, the cafes overcrowded, with music and dancing till the early hours. Sunday excursion traffic is setting record figures. And despite all this symptoms of a good economic situation, the mood in broad sections of the population does not accord with the boom conditions. Either it is largely depressed about the future, or unconcerned about the morrow for the sake of a merry carpe diem [enjoy today]...For the broad mass of the population does not concern itself much with the financial background of the German economic recovery. Rather there exists in the broadest section of the population the earnest concern that in the long or short run a war will put an end to the economic prosperity and have a terrible end for Germany.' (Kershaw 151-52)
The Persecutions And Public Opinion
In contrast to the vast importance that German public opinion attributed to the regime's domestic, economic, and foreign policies, most of the population was rather indifferent to the measures being taken against ΓÇ£inferiorΓÇ¥ minorities, especially the Jews and also the Roma (Gypsies). There were, of course, places in which the Nazis could find Germans who fervently supported their antisemitic rhetoric and actions. Most of the public, however, did not respond actively to the incitement, contrary to the expectations raised by the centrality of antisemitism in Nazi ideology. On the other hand, this same majority of the population expressed essentially no criticism of the onslaught against the Jews and displayed no solidarity with the victims.
More On Reactions To The Persecutions
The disparate attitudes toward the Jews in German public opinion were given a clear expression following the Kristallnacht pogrom, on the night of November 9-10, 1938. The SOPADE (The Executive Committee of the Exile Social Democratic Party of Germany) reports on these events reveal two clear trends in public opinion: 'The brutal measures against the Jews have caused great indignation among the population. People spoke their minds quite openly, and many Aryans were arrested as a result. When it became known that a Jewish woman had been taken from childbed, even a police official said that this was too much: where is Germany heading, if these methods are being used? As a result, he was arrested too.[…] After the Jews, who are going to be the next victims?' That is what people are asking. Will it be the Catholics? Or will an emergency general capital levy be imposed? […] In the whole […] region there is great anger at this vandalism.' (Peukert 58) "That's the right way" 'Berlin: The population's attitude was not fully unanimous. When the Jewish Synagogue was burning… a large number of women could be heard saying That's the right way to do it – it's a pity there are not any more Jews inside, that would be the best way to smoke out the whole lousy lot of them'. No one dared to take a stand against these sentiments.” (Friedlaender 295)
Foreign Policy
Anschluss: The AnnexationOf Austria
Following the Nazi regime's foreign policy achievements throughout 1933ΓÇô1937, when his government was now fully staffed with Nazi officials, Hitler resolved to continue expanding the Reich in accordance with Nazi ideology. The annexation of Austria, Hitler's country of birth and a country, which had at one time been part of the German Reich, was one of the Fuehrer's strongest aspirations. Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg, was aware of Hitler's intentions but was unable to secure a European guarantee to prevent them.
The Nazi Annexation Of Austria
February 1938: Hitler urged Schuschnigg, to allow Austrian Nazis to operate domestically without restrictions. In early March, Schuschnigg was forced to resign and was replaced by Nazi interior minister, Arthur Seyss-Inquart. By the orders that he received from Goering on March 12, the chancellor opened Austria's borders to German forces. Cheering crowds greeted Hitler and the German Nazi forces on their entrance to Vienna. Next day, he proclaimed Austria's reunification with the German Reich. Vienna became the seat of a Reich representative; the name Austria was obliterated.
More On 1: Operation Otto
On March 11, 1938, Hitler launched Operation Otto, code name for the invasion of Austria. He asked that this action be taken as calmly as possible, since he hoped in this way to earn the sympathy of the Austrian public and to avoid having to take precautions along the borders of Germany. 'How to conduct the operation 1. If other measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population. The whole operation will be directed by myself... The behaviour of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms. 4. On the remaining German frontiers no security measures are to be taken for the time being.' (Noakes 535-36)
More On 2: World's Response To The Annexation
The response by the European powers to the annexation of Austria constituted one of several incentives, which led Hitler to carry on with his expansionist campaign. Great Britain criticised Nazi aggression but tended to view the annexation itself with understanding. France, immersed in internal political crises, paid very little attention to events in the European arena. The Soviet Union also avoided taking any tangible measures and contented itself with a statement of its willingness to discuss the annexation in an international forum. Mussolini, by contrast, cabled Hitler his warm felicitations, and even Chinese leader Chiang Kai Shek joined the ranks of those who congratulated the Fuehrer. The response of the USA was somehow ambivalent. Its Ambassadors in London and Berlin warned the democracies in Europe that they can not automatically count on American help, while at the same time cautioning Germany that the United States might fight even in the event its own territories are not invaded.
The Annexation of the Sudetenland
The Nazi's unchallenged success in Austria prompted them to step up their activity in the Sudetenland, a region in Czechoslovakia populated largely by ethnic Germans. After Hitler's accession to power in 1933, the population of this area became increasingly inclined to secede from the Czechoslovak State, and the local Nazi Party, headed by Konrad Henlein, grew in power. In March 1938, Hitler ordered Henlein to exacerbate the tensions with the Czech government in order to provide an excuse for German military intervention. However, in an effort to check the increase in power, which Germany was likely to accrue as a result of a confrontation with Czechoslovakia, Great Britain stepped in to mediate. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, met with Hitler in September and after a discussion acceded to Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland . France seconded the British position, and Czechoslovakia had no choice but to capitulate. At the Godesberg conference (September 22ΓÇô23), Hitler presented a new demand: the dispatch of German armed forces to Czechoslovakia. However, he refrained from taking immediate action after being urged by Mussolini to hold a conference of European powers to discuss the problem. The conference was scheduled for the end of the month in Munich.
More On: The Atmosphere At Godesberg Discussion
The level of tension at the Godesberg discussions is related in the memoirs of Ivon Kirkpatrick, chief of staff at the British Embassy in Berlin: "Pained silence" '...The question of principle having been settled, it only remain to discuss the ways and means of transferring the territory in an orderly manner. On this point he [Chamberlain] had proposals to make which would doubtless be the subject of discussion at the present meeting...Hitler merely gazed down the table and said in a dry rasping voice: Es tut mir leid, aber das geht nicht mehr'. And with these words he pushed his chair back from the table, crossed his legs, folded his arms and turned to scowl at Mr Chamberlain. Schmidt translated: I am very sorry, but all that is no longer any use'. There was a long pause of pained silence. That was the atmosphere in which the Godesberg peace negotiations began'. (Noakes 545-46)
The Munich Conference
On September 29, 1938, the leaders of Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy convened in Munich. The basis for the discussions was a memorandum prepared by a German Foreign Ministry official, Konstantin von Neurath, the director-general of the Ministry, Ernst von Weizsoecker, and the Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, Hermann Goering. After Hitler approved the memorandum, it was forwarded to the Italians, who presented it at the conference as if it was they who had prepared it. On the basis of this memorandum, the conference participants elaborated the following resolution the next day: Cession of the Sudeteland 'Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement which has already been reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession... 1. The evacuation will begin on 1 October. 2. The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by 10 October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and that the Czechoslovak Government shall be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations. 4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops shall begin on 1 October... 6. The final determination of the frontiers shall be carried out by the international commission. 8. The Czechoslovak Government shall within a period of six weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government shall within the same period release Sudeten Germans prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.'
Annex To The Agreement
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of 19 September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.' (Noakes 547-48) The Munich agreement enabled Hitler to send his forces into the Sudetenland on October 1, in complete disregard of the clause in the agreement that stipulated an incremental occupation. The German annexation of the Sudetenland placed Czechoslovakia's very existence as a sostate at serious risk.
The Invasion Of Czechoslovakia
Following the annexation of the Sudetenland , Hitler's further goals began to become clear: these included the occupation of additional parts of Czechoslovakia. On 11 March 1939 Hitler prodded Slovak nationalist leader Jozef Tiso to secede from the central government in Prague. Four days later, Hitler apprised the President of Czechoslovakia that he must allow German forces to enter Prague. The communication was buttressed by a threat added by Goering: In the event of resistance, the German air force would reduce Prague to rubble. The Czech President was forced to accept the German dictate. The Wehrmacht marched into western Czechoslovakia and on March 16 Hitler was able to proclaim the formation of the ΓÇ£Protectorate of Bohemia and MoraviaΓÇ¥ - all without having to face resistance from the local population.
Ribbentrop - Molotov Pact
Following the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Hitler nullified the marine agreements that he had concluded with Britain in 1935 and instructed his army to prepare for the next conquest - Poland - on September 1, 1939. To head off the possibility of a Soviet-British alliance that might frustrate his ambitions, Hitler rushed to conclude an agreement with Moscow before the date he had designated for the invasion of Poland. German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop set out for Moscow in mid-August. On August 23, with Stalin's approval, Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov signed a German-Russian non-aggression pact with Ribbentrop. The pact constituted a commitment on the part of the two powers that they would not support any country that entered into a state of war with either of the signatories. The accord spelled the isolation of the Western powers.
Ribbentrop - Molotov Pact
The principle provision of the pact, however, was a confidential addendum which demarcated the German and the Soviet borders and spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. By concluding this agreement, Hitler offered Stalin more than the Western powers could offer him. In return, Stalin gave Hitler freedom of action in Poland. The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact actually divided Poland between the Soviet Union and Germany, and paved the way for the German invasion to Poland and the outbreak of the Second World War.
Secret Additional Protocol
In the event of a territorial transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,), the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontiers of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the USSR. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna territory is recognised by both parties. In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of interest of both Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of rivers Narev, Vistula and San. The question whether the interest of both parties make the maintenance of an independent Polish State appear desirable and how the frontiers of this State should be drawn can be definitely determined only in the course of further political developments... With regard to South eastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasises its interests in Bessarabia. The German side declares complete political disinterest in these territories.' (Noakes 561-62)
The Outbreak Of Second World War
By the end of the summer of 1939, Hitler felt that Germany had gathered enough military and economic strength, had been recognised as an international power - and that he personally had gained broad public support. The conditions had become ripe for the instigation of a war through which the Fuehrer would accomplish all his aspirations. Determined to aggrandise Germany's might and to obliterate her political and ideological enemies, Hitler embarked on a war that would bring disaster upon many millions of human beings world wide.
